Two-way Flow Networks with Small Decay by Kris De Jaegher & Jurjen Kamphorst
Tjalling C. Koopmans Research Institute  
 
Tjalling C. Koopmans Research Institute 
Utrecht School of Economics 
Utrecht University 
 
Janskerkhof 12   
3512 BL Utrecht 
The Netherlands 
telephone   +31 30 253 9800 
fax     +31 30 253 7373 
website   www.koopmansinstitute.uu.nl 
  
The Tjalling C. Koopmans Institute is the research institute 
and research school of Utrecht School of Economics.  
It was founded in 2003, and named after Professor Tjalling C. 
Koopmans, Dutch-born Nobel Prize laureate in economics of 
1975.  
 
In the discussion papers series the Koopmans Institute 
publishes results of ongoing research for early dissemination 
of research results, and to enhance discussion with colleagues.  
 
Please send any comments and suggestions on the Koopmans 
institute, or this series to J.M.vanDort@uu.nl  
 




How to reach the authors 
  




Erasmus School of Economics 
Erasmus University Rotterdam 
Postbus 1738 
3000 DR Rotterdam 
The Netherlands. 
E-mail: kamphorst@ese.eur.nl  
 
Kris De Jaegher 
Utrecht University 
Utrecht School of Economics 
Janskerkhof 12 
3512 BL Utrecht 
The Netherlands.  






This paper can be downloaded at: http:// 
www.uu.nl/rebo/economie/discussionpapers Utrecht School of Economics 
Tjalling C. Koopmans Research Institute 














    
aUtrecht School of Economics 
Utrecht University 
 
bErasmus School of Economics 






The set of equilibrium networks in the two-way flow model of network formation 
(Bala and Goyal, 2000) is very sensitive to the introduction of decay. Even if decay 
is small enough so that equilibrium networks are minimal, the set of equilibrium 
architectures becomes much richer, especially when the benefit functions are non-
linear. However, not much is known about these architectures. In this paper we 
remedy this gap in the literature. We characterize the equilibrium architectures. 
Moreover, we show results on the relative stability of different types of 
architectures. Three of the results are that (i) at most one players receives multiple 
links, (ii) the absolute diameter of equilibrium networks can be arbitrarily large, and 
(iii) large (small) diameter networks are relatively stable under concave (convex) 
benefit functions. 
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 Two-way ￿ ow networks with small decay
1 Introduction
Not much is known about the architectures of "strict Nash Networks" (SNNs)
in the two way ￿ ow model (introduced in the seminal paper by Bala and Goyal,
2000a) when there is decay.1 That is despite the fact that this seminal arti-
cle demonstrates that the set of equilibrium architectures is quite sensitive to
even very small levels of decay. The two main results which are known about
this are the following. First, if there are constant marginal bene￿ts of infor-
mation (CMBI) all stars can be SNNs, as well as interlinked stars (Bala and
Goyal, 2000a). Second, if there are decreasing marginal bene￿ts of information
(DMBI), then the only SNN is the "periphery sponsored star" (PSS) provided
that two conditions are satis￿ed: (i) information cannot travel beyond a certain
maximum distance, and (ii) the population size is large enough (Hojman and
Szeidl, 2008). As interlinked stars have diameter 3 (meaning that no two play-
ers are more than three links apart), and stars have diameter two, a super￿cial
reading of this literature might give the impression that equilibrium networks
are necessarily small in diameter. As we will demonstrate, this impression would
be false.
In this paper we study the two-way ￿ ow model with a small level of decay. We
provide an extended characterization of SNNs for any population size and any
increasing bene￿t function, not just CMBI or DMBI. Furthermore, we are able
to state some results on the relative stability of di⁄erent network architectures
which are potential SNNs for three special cases: CMBI , DMBI and IMBI
(increasing marginal bene￿ts of information). In line with the above two papers,
we ￿nd that the PSS is the most stable network architecture. However, the
results also show a gap under small decay and DMBI: stable networks are either
PSS (diameter two) or they have some minimal diameter d (where d ￿ 4), where
d may be arbitrarily large2.
The two way ￿ ow model has been extensively studied and been modi￿ed in
several directions such as player heterogeneity3 and link reliability4.Unlike those
1This paper is an extended version of our 2008 working paper Network Formation with
Decreasing Marginal Bene￿ts of Information (TKI discussion paper 08-16). It treats constant
and increasing marginal bene￿ts on top of the decreasing marginal bene￿ts treated in our
2008 paper. Moreover, on top of the necessary conditions for stability of networks treated in
our 2008 paper, the current paper treats su¢ cient conditions as well.
2Although for large diameter SNNs, the diameter is relatively small as compared to the
population size. The reason is the minimum population needed to create a stable network of
diameter d is increasing exponentially in d:
3For instance, Galeotti et al. (2006), and Kamphorst and Van der Laan (2007).
4See for instance Bala and Goyal (2000b) and Haller et al. (2005).
1papers, this paper does not extend the two way ￿ ow model in any way. Instead
it continues the analysis of decays where Bala and Goyal (2000a) stopped. We
believe that this analysis provides worthwhile and unforeseen results.5
In Section 2 we will present the model, and some standard preliminary re-
sults. Section 3 provides the initial extended characterization of the SNNs. The
relative stability of di⁄erent candidate SNNs is then studied in Section 4 for
three special types of bene￿t functions: CMBI, DMBI and IMBI. There we will
also ￿rst demonstrate the gap in diameters of the set of SNNs for DMBI. We
are able to extend the characterization further in Section 5 by looking at weakly
smaller levels of decay. This results in a condition which we call the balancing
condition. This balancing condition allows us to show that all networks which
satisfy balancing condition as well as the properties derived in Section 3 are
stable for some positive range of the parameters. Hence each such network is
indeed relevant. These networks may have any diameter larger than two, pro-
vided that the population is large enough. Moreover, we show a stronger result
on the diameter gap: only the maximal diameter candidate networks are stable
next to the PSS. We end with a discussion of the results in Section 6.
2 The Model
Consider a population of n agents denoted by the set N with n ￿ 3: Each player
faces the choice to which of the other players he will sponsor a link. A link by
player i (the sponsor) to player j (the recipient) is denoted by (i;j); or ij for
short. The set of all links that a player i can possibly sponsor is given by
Li￿fkj 2 N ￿ N : k = i; j 6= ig:




Li = fij 2 N ￿ N : i 6= jg:
We typically denote the strategy of player i ￿the set of links that he sponsors
￿by gi. His strategy space Gi, where obviously gi 2 Gi, is therefore the collection
of all subsets of Li, speci￿cally:
Gi￿fgi ￿ N ￿ N : gi ￿ Lig:





5Non-linear bene￿ts have also been studied in other types of network formation models.
See Vergara-Ca⁄arelli (2004) for an example in the one-way ￿ow model; Buechel (2007) for
an example with two sided link formation; Goyal and Joshi (2006) for an example with two
sided link formation and non-linearity of payo⁄s in the number of own links and the number
of links by others; and Bloch and Dutta (2009) for an example with endogenous link strength
(and non-linearity of bene￿ts in link strengths).
6Observe that the strategy pro￿le coincides with the network. In this paper we will refer
to any strategy pro￿le as a network. Similarly, we will refer to any (strict) Nash equilibrium
as a (strict) Nash network.
2The strategy space G is therefore the set of all possible networks, which is
the collection of all subsets of the set of all possible links. Thus
G ￿fg ￿ N ￿ N : g ￿ Lg;
1 2 4 3
Figure 1: Example of a 4 player network g; where g = f12;23;43g:
We can depict such a network g in a graph, where the players are the nodes,
and each link ii0 2 g is represented by an arrow (directed arc) from i to i0: For
example, Figure 1 shows the network f12;23;43g.
Now we come to the (dis)incentives for players to sponsor links. The dis-
incentives arise because sponsoring links is costly. The costs of a link ij are
denoted by cij; and are incurred completely by the sponsor; the recipient in-
curs no costs. Because we wish to focus on the bene￿ts of link formation we
model the cost side as simple as possible: cij = c for all i;j 2 N: Let NS
i (g)
￿ N be the set of players to whom player i sponsors a link in g; so NS
i (g)





Players derive bene￿ts from being connected to each other by a path of links.
On this path, it does not matter who the sponsor of the links are. The bene￿ts
of a link ￿ ￿ ow in two directions￿ . To make this precise, we let ij 2 g denote
that ij 2 g or ji 2 g or both7. We say that in network g players i0 and ik are
connected if there exists some subset of players Ni0ik ￿ N; Ni0ik = fi0;:::;ikg
such that for all ‘ 2 f1;:::;kg we have that i‘￿1i‘ 2 g. When two players are
connected, they exchange their private information. Let Ni (g) denote the set
of players to whom player i is connected in network g:
In this paper, we will assume that there is decay. In other words, as this
information travels through the network it becomes less accurate or less com-
plete. We assume that what is lost at each step is independent of the path the
information travels. Hence only the shortest path between any two players is
relevant. We say that the distance between players i and j in network g is the
length (i.e. the number of links) of the shortest path between these two players.
We denote this distance by dij (g):8 We follow the convention in assuming that
every time the information is passed on a constant fraction (1 ￿ ￿) of the (re-
maining) information is lost, where ￿ 2 (0;1]. Observe that decay gives players
7So ij 2 g says that the intersection of fij;jig and g is not empty.
8Note that by two-way ￿ow we have that dij = dji for all i;j 2 N:
3incentives to sponsor links to players to whom they are already connected for
the purpose of reducing the distance between them. However, throughout this
paper we assume that ￿ is large enough to ensure minimality of any Nash net-
work9, meaning that any two players are not connected by more than one path
of links. So the amount of decay is limited.
We assume that each player has one unit of private information. The value
of the information does not depend on the original owner of this information,
so any two units of information are a priori equally valuable. Players derive
bene￿ts from the information which they gathered. To model the bene￿ts we
need a few more de￿nitions.
Let Nk
i (g) ￿ N be the set of players at distance k from player i in net-
work g: So Nk
i (g) ￿ fj 2 N : dij (g) = kg: Due to decay, the total amount of













Note that by de￿nition, N0
i (g) = 1. We call Ii (g) player i￿ s ex-post infor-
mation, as it is the information that i obtains after having decided to sponsor
all links in gi.
The bene￿ts derived by player i from network g; Vi (g); are an increasing
function of Ii (g); speci￿cally
Vi (g) = f (Ii (g))
where f0 > 0. In Section 4 we study three special types of bene￿t function,
namely either f00 (I) = 0 8I ￿ 0 (CMBI), f00 (I) < 0 8I ￿ 0 (DMBI), or
f00 (I) > 0 8I ￿ 0 (IMBI).
The utility which i obtains in g equals his bene￿ts minus his costs. Formally,




De￿ne g￿i as all the links in g excluding the links sponsored by player i. A
network g is a SNN if for each player i 2 N and all g0
i 2 Gi; g0
i 6= gi; we have
Ui (g) > Ui (g￿i [ g0
i):
Similarly, in a Nash network every player plays a best reply strategy. Denote
by BR
f
i (g) the set of best reply strategies of player i versus network g under




















9For instance BG and Lemma 2 show that there exists some ￿ ￿ < 1 such that for all ￿ > ￿ ￿
this is indeed the case.
4If in a Nash network the best reply set for each player is singleton then the
network is a SNN.
Each network g partitions the population into components (of g), where
two players belong to the same component if and only if they are connected.
Component k is denoted as Ck (g). Note that a player￿ s information is also
de￿ned over a component, just as it is over a graph.
A network is minimal if the deletion of any link in that network will re-
sult in an increase of the number of components. A cycle is a set of links ￿
j0j1;:::;jk￿1jk
￿
such that j0 = jk: This implies that a component (or net-
work) is minimal if and only if it contains no cycles. We call a link which is not
part of a cycle a minimal link, while any link which is part of a cycle is called a
non-minimal link. A network may contain an end sponsor i, namely a player i
who sponsors a link to a player j who does not have any links to players other
than i; we call j an end recipient, and the link between i and j an end link.
We now de￿ne our concept of the best informed player. For a network g and
for M, M ￿ N, de￿ne network gM as the set of links of network g of which
both the sponsor and the recipient of the link belong to M: Formally:
gM = fij 2 g : i;j 2 Mg:
De￿nition 1 Let M ￿ N be a connected subset of players in network g: Then
player i; i 2 M; is a best informed player of M if Ii (gM) ￿ Ij (gM) for all
j 2 M:
Remark 1 If in network g some player i is not part of component Ck (g), then
the additional information he receives from sponsoring a link to some player
j; j 2 Ck (g); is ￿Ij (g): Since all links cost the same, and because utility is
strictly increasing in information the best link which player i can have into the
component is to this component￿ s best informed player10. Moreover, by the same
arguments it follows that player i is indi⁄erent between any two most informed
players of a particular component.
Let ii0 2 g. Then we denote the set of players observed by player i exclusively
via link ii0 by Aii0 (g): So
Aii0 (g) = fj 2 N : j 2 Ni (g) and j = 2 Ni (gnfii0g)g:
Example 2 Consider the network in Figure 1. There A12 (g) = f2;3;4g; and
A23 (g) = f3;4g:
10Note that without decay (so ￿ = 1), every player in any connected set is a most valuable
player in that set. This concept can also be useful when considering heterogeneous agents.
5Denote by jAii0 (g)j the cardinality of this set, i.e. the number of players that
i indirectly assesses by sponsoring a link to i0. Additionally, we de￿ne AI
ii0 (g;￿)




j 2 Aii0 (g) : j is a best informed player in gAii0(g)
￿
:
Example 3 Consider the network in Figure 1. There for any ￿; AI
12 (g;￿) =
f3g: Player 3 gathers 1 + 2￿ in network gnf12g; whereas players 2 and 4 only
gather 1+￿+￿
2 (which is less, since ￿ < 1). Moreover AI
23 (g;￿) = f3;4g; since
in network gnf23g players 3 and 4 both collect 1 + ￿ information.
Using the notation above, gAii0(g) is the component to which player i gains
access by sponsoring a link to i0.
Moreover the set Aii0 (g) is useful in de￿ning the orientation of a link ii0 2 g
with respect to some player j 2 N:
De￿nition 2 A link ii0 2 g is said to point to player j if j 2 Aii0 (g):
A link ii0 2 g is said to point away from player j if j observes Aii0 (g) via
ii0 and this set Aii0 (g) is non-empty.
Two non-non-minimal links point towards each other if and only if the spon-
sors of these two links observe each other through these two links.12
Example 4 In the network of Figure 1 link 23 points to players 3 and 4, and
away from players 1 and 2. Moreover links 12 and 43 point towards each other.
Before we start our actual characterization, we ￿rst provide two results assur-
ing that networks connecting only part of the players, and networks containing
redundant players, cannot be SNN. To derive the result that networks contain-
ing redundant players cannot be SNN, we ￿rst show that in the absence of decay,
non-empty SNN are always minimal.
Lemma 1 In the absence of decay, no player in any network g prefers to spon-
sor non-minimal links.
Proof. Any non-minimal link yields a marginal bene￿t of zero. As linking is
costly, a player sponsoring a non-minimal link is better o⁄ when deleting any
one of his non-minimal links.
We now de￿ne two levels threshold levels of decay, and after that we show
that both are smaller than one.
11Let M ￿ N: The identity of the best informed player in gM may depend on ￿: This is one
of the reasons why in Sections 5 and 6 we are able to get additional results by tightening the
restrictions on ￿.
12Formally: consider links ii0 2 g and jj0 2 g; then these point towards each other if and
only if i 2 Ajj0 (g) and j 2 Aii0 (g):
6De￿nition 3 Let ￿M (c;n;f (I)) be the lowest level of decay such that for all
￿ > ￿M (c;n;f (I)) no player in any network prefers to sponsor a non-minimal
link.
De￿nition 4 Let ￿R (c;n;f (I)) be the lowest level of decay such that for all
￿ > ￿R (c;n;f (I)) any SNN g is minimal.
We now show that both thresholds are strictly below 1.
Lemma 2 For any c > 0; n ￿ 3; and f (I) > 0 we have ￿R(c;n;f (I)) ￿
￿M (c;n;f (I)) < 1.
Proof. Note that the bene￿t function is continuous in ￿: By this continuity
it follows from Lemma 1 that ￿R(c;n;f (I));￿M (c;n;f (I)) < 1: Moreover the
minimality of every SNN does not imply that there is no other network (for
instance the line) where some player does prefer to sponsor a non-minimal link,
hence ￿R(c;n;f (I)) ￿ ￿M (c;n;f (I)).
Note that the minimality of every SNN does not imply that there is no other
network (for instance the line) where some player does prefer to sponsor a non-
minimal link. However, if ￿ > ￿M (c;n;f (I)); then it follows that no SNN is
non-minimal.
Before starting our actual characterization, we have thus shown that for
small decay all non-empty SNN must be minimal networks, i.e. trees or forests
with directed links. Two highly stylized networks that play an important role
in our analysis are the center-sponsored star (CSS) and the periphery-sponsored
star (PSS). Stars are minimal connected networks where one player, the char-
acterizing player, has a link (either as sponsor or as recipient) with every other
player (see Networks A-C in Figure 2). The CSS is a special case of the star
where the characterizing player sponsors each link (Network A), while the PSS
s a special case of the star where the characterizing player sponsors each link
(Network C). Stars have a small diameter, where the diameter of a minimal
connected network is de￿ned as the maximal distance that exists between two
players in the network.
The role of decay is important, not only because the concept makes sense,
but also because it greatly a⁄ects the set of SNNs. For large levels of decay this
is obvious. Players have incentives to sponsore non-minimal links in order to
reduce their distance to other players. Bala and Goyal (2000) showed moreover,
that even at levels of decay where this e⁄ect plays no role, the in￿ uence of decay
is profound. It makes homogeneous players di⁄er in how attractive they are as
recipients, by their position in a component. In fact, they showed that for no
decay and any increasing bene￿t function only the CSS was a SNN, while with
small amounts of decay13 and a CMBI bene￿t function all star networks, but
also networks of diameter 3 can be SNNs. However, they restricted themselves
13Decay small enough so that all SNNs are minimal.
7to some examples and a CMBI bene￿t function. In the following section we
will identify all networks which can be stable with such small decay, for any
increasing bene￿t function. This will include networks of any diameter, provided
the population size is large enough. We will also show that each such candidate
network is indeed a SNN for some range of parameters and class of bene￿t
functions.
3 Characterization
In this section we will present the characterization of SNN networks in the
two way ￿ ow model with decay. We will start with a preliminary result on the
recipients of links in minimal Nash networks. Second we will introduce two types
of players given the network, which we will use to characterize the network. Then
we will present our main proposition, Proposition 1, after which the seperate
parts of the proposition will be proved in seperate subsections. We ￿nish this
section by showing that the characterizing players are either central or close to
central in the network.In Section 5 we will further extend this characterization
by looking at weakly smaller levels of decay.
We start by a straightforward preliminary result on the recipients of links
in Nash equilibria. It is based on the observation that if in network g players
i and j are not connected, then if i sponsors a link to j he receives additional
information equal to ￿Ij (g): Hence if a player wants to connect himself to some
other component, his best option is a link to a best informed player of that
component.
Lemma 3 Let ￿ > ￿R(c;n;f (I)): If g is a Nash network; then j 2 AI
ij (g) for
all ij 2 g. Furthermore, if g is a strict Nash network, then fjg = AI
ij (g) for all
links ij 2 g.
Proof. By ￿ > ￿R(c;n;f (I)) we have that g is minimal. Hence every link, say
ij; in g connects the sponsor to some component of gnfijg which he is not part
of. This component is Cl (gnfijg) = Aij (g): Hence we can use our arguments
from Remark 1, which implies that it is optimal for for player i to sponsor the
link to j only if j is a most informed player of that component, i.e. if j 2 AI
ij (g):
Since indi⁄erence is not allowed in a strict Nash network, we have the stronger
condition that fjg = AI
ij (g) if g is a strict Nash network.
For the characterization it is necessary to identify to types of players, given
the network.
De￿nition 5 De￿ne as a multi-recipient player a player who receives at
least two links.
De￿nition 6 De￿ne as a non-recipient player a player who does not receive
any links from any player.
8We will prove that each SNN will have either a unique multi-recipient player
or no multi-recipient player. If he exists, this unique multi-recipient player will
be the ￿ characterizing player￿of the network. If he does not exist, it will follow
that there is a unique non-recipient player. We will then de￿ne this player as
the ￿ characterizing player￿ of the network.
This enables us to characterize the SNN as follows.
Proposition 1 Let g be a non-empty strict Nash network and Vi (g) = f (Ii (g))
for all i 2 N: Moreover let ￿ > ￿R(c;n;f (I)). Then g has the following proper-
ties:
1. Network g is minimal connected.
2. There is a unique characterizing player in g. If a multi-recipient player
exists in g, then he is the unique multi-recipient player in g, and he will
be the characterizing player of g. If no multi-recipient player exists in
g, then there exists a unique non-recipient player in g and he will be the
characterizing player of g:
3. Network links tend to be outward-oriented in the following way:
(a) if the characterizing player is a multi-recipient player, all links point
away from him, except for those links of which the characterizing
player is the recipient.
(b) if the characterizing player is a non-recipient player, then all links
point away from him.
4. Every recipient of a link in a SNN either has no other links, or at least
two other links.
To simplify the formulations in this paper, we de￿ne ￿ candidate network￿as
follows.
De￿nition 7 For a given ￿ > ￿R(c;n;f (I)); we say that any network satisfying
both Lemma 3 and Properties in Proposition 1 is called a candidate network.
Moreover, we say that a link is outward-oriented if it points away from the
characterizing player.
Examples of candidate networks are shown in Figure 2, where multi-recipient
characterizing players are indicated by triangles, while non-recipient character-
izing players are indicated by a square.
These results will be proven in a number of subsections. Readers familiar
with the literature will ￿nd Property 1 of Proposition 1 quite standard. These
readers might want to focus on Subsections 3.2 to 3.4. Subsection 3.2 proves













Figure 2: Example networks ￿tting Proposition 1.
103. These Properties, as well as Property 4 are quite selective among the set of
minimal connected networks by imposing a lot of structure on the orientation
of the links. For instance, none of the links in Networks (F) or (I) of Figure
2 could be reversed14. Also network architectures with larger diameters need
enough ￿ branches￿ , as shown by Property 4. This excludes for instance network
architectures such as the line, for n ￿ 4: Lastly note that the proposition above
does not exclude the existence of large diameter SNNs as Proposition 9 will
show in combination with Proposition 8 in Section 5.
Subsections 3.4 and 5.2 are relevant for the interpretation of the provided
characterization, as discussed in the introduction of this Section.
3.1 Characterization of Part 1
The minimality of g follows immediately from Lemma 2 and ￿ > ￿R(c;n;f (I)):
Connectedness will be proven by the following two Lemmas15.
Lemma 4 Let network g be a non-empty SNN and ￿ > ￿R(c;n;f (I)). Then g
has no singleton component.
Proof. Suppose not. Then there exists a player, say j, who is isolated. More-
over, by minimality and non-emptiness of g; there exists some player i who
receives no links, but does sponsor a set of links himself, namely to all players
in N S
i (g): Note that Ii (g￿i) = Ij (g￿i) = Ij (g): Now let player j consider
strategy g0




ji0 2 L : i0 2 NS
i (g)
￿
: This costs him the same as gi costs player i: But
the bene￿ts to player j are strictly larger because he accesses the same players
at the same distance as player i does and in addition he will be connected to
player i. Hence if gi is a best reply for player i to network g; then gj = f;g
cannot be a best reply to player j: Since g is a SNN by assumption, this forms
a contradiction.
Lemma 5 Let network g be a non-empty SNN and ￿ > ￿R(c;n;f (I)). Then g
is connected.
Proof. Suppose not. Then by Lemma 4 there is a strict Nash network g
which contains multiple non-singleton components. Without loss of generality
we have ii0;jj0 2 g such that i and i0 belong to one component, say C1 (g);
and j and j0 to another, say C2 (g): Because g is a strict Nash network, player
i prefers to sponsor a link to i0 and not to any player in C2 (g): So player i0
has access to more information in gnfii0g than j0 in g: Hence we obtain that
Ii0 (g) > Ii0 (gnfii0g) > Ij0 (g) > Ij0 (gnfjj0g): Because g is Nash, we also have
that Ii0 (g) < Ij0 (gnfjj0g); which gives us a contradiction. Hence any Nash
network has only one component and is therefore connected.
14By reversal it is meant that the recipient becomes the sponsor, and the sponsor the
recipient.
15This result is similar to Bala and Goyal (2000a) Proposition 4.1.
11So all non-empty SNNs are connected. Naturally, if costs are low enough
the empty network is not a SNN, implying that all SNNs are connected. Since
the minimal bene￿t an isolated player would derive from sponsoring a link is
f (1 + ￿) ￿ f (1), Lemma 5 implies the following corollary.
Corollary 1 Let c < f (1 + ￿) ￿ f (1); then any network g which is a SNN is
connected.
Bala and Goyal (2000) pointed out that there always exists a strict Nash
network. Under these more general bene￿t functions this remains true. Note
that for c ￿ f (1 + (n ￿ 1)￿) ￿ f (1) the empty network is a SNN, while for
c < f (1 + (n ￿ 1)￿) ￿ f (1) the PSS is a SNN:
3.2 Characterization of Parts 2 and 3
In this subsection we will ￿rst introduce a powerful lemma from which much
of the characterization is derived. This lemma says that if in a SNN network
both i and j observe each other via a link that they sponsor themselves (so their
links point towards each other), the recipient of the link sponsored by i is the
same player as the recipient of the link by j: From this result Parts 2 and 3 of
Proposition 1 will follow.
Lemma 6 Let g be a strict Nash network and ￿ > ￿R(c;n;f (I)). If j 2 Aii0 (g)
and i 2 Ajj0 (g) then i0 = j0:
Proof. We prove this by contradiction. Suppose not, so i0 6= j0: Note that by
minimality there is one path connecting i and j; and this path goes via players
i0 and j0. Now observe that, with decay, the players who lose most if a link is
deleted are the ones closest by. So
Ii0 (g) ￿ Ii0 (gnfii0g) > Ij0 (g) ￿ Ij0 (gnfii0g); and (1)
Ii0 (g) ￿ Ii0 (gnfjj0g) < Ij0 (g) ￿ Ij0 (gnfjj0g) (2)
By Lemma 3, i0 is more informed than j0 in gAii0(g); implying that
Ii0 (gnfii0g) > Ij0 (gnfii0g)
Applying Eq. 1 gives:
Ii0 (g) > Ij0 (g);
after which Eq. 2 tells us that
Ii0 (gnfjj0g) > Ij0 (gnfjj0g) (3)
However Eq. 3 implies that j0 = 2 AI
jj0 (g;￿); which contradicts Lemma 3. Hence
a contradiction arises.
12Verbally the proof of this lemma is that player i0 receives more information
via the link ii0 than player j0 does, as i0 is at least one link closer to i and
the players behind i than j0 is. Similarly, player j0 receives more information
than i0 via the link jj0: Now, if g is a SNN, then i0 is more informed than j0 in
gAii0(g); and therefore i0 is also more informed than j0 in gAjj0(g): However that
contradicts that g is Nash, since jj0 is sponsored in g; while link ji0 would have
given him more information at the same cost.
Using this lemma, we can now show the properties of the characterizing
players in the network (Parts 2 and 3 of Proposition 1).
Lemma 7 Let g be a strict Nash network and ￿ > ￿R(c;n;f (I)). Then there
is at most one multi-recipient player.
Proof. Suppose that players i and j are both multi-recipient players. Because g
is minimally connected, players i and j are connected by at most one path. This
means that both players receive at least one link which is not part of the path
connecting them. These links point toward each other which implies by Lemma
6 that i = j. Since i and j were arbitrarily chosen multi-recipient players, it
follows that there cannot be more than one multi-recipient player.
Lemma 8 Let g be a strict Nash network and ￿ > ￿R(c;n;f (I)). Then if a
player is a multi-recipient player, all links which he does not receive point away
from him.
Proof. Let player i0 be a multi-recipient player and let there be any link pointing
towards i0: So there exists some jj0 2 g such that i0 2 Ajj0 (g): Since player i0
receives at least two links, there exists some player i 2 Ajj0 (g) such that ii0 2 g:
It follows that j 2 Aii0 (g): By Lemma 6 it must be that j0 = i0:
Lemmas 7 and 8 prove that at most one multi-recipient player exists in
a strict Nash network, and that all links either point away from him, or are
received by him.
We will now prove that for any non-empty SNN there is exactly one non-
recipient player if it contains no multi-recipient player. Moreover, all links will
point away from that non-recipient player.
Lemma 9 Let g be a strict Nash network and ￿ > ￿R(c;n;f (I)). If there is
no multi-recipient player in network g; then there is exactly one non-recipient
player.
Proof. Recall that g is minimal. Hence n￿1 links exists. If no player receives
more than 1 link, then n￿1 players receive one link. Therefore there is a unique
player who receives no links.
13Lemma 10 Let g be a strict Nash network and ￿ > ￿R(c;n;f (I)). If there is
no multi-recipient player then all links point away from the non-recipient player.
Proof. Suppose not, so there is no multi-recipient player. Moreover let i be
the non-recipient player. Suppose that there exists a link jj0 2 g such that
i 2 Ajj0 (g). Because g is minimally connected and because i receives no links,
there exists a link ii0 2 g such that j0 2 Aii0 (g): Lemma 6 then implies that
i0 = j0; which implies that player i0 receives at least two links. Namely one
from i and one from j: Thus i0 is a multi-recipient player which contradicts our
assumption that g has no multi-recipient players.
If g is a SNN, then we will call the unique multi-recipient player the char-
acterizing player or, if no multi-recipient player exists, we will call the unique
non-recipient player the characterizing player. Together with these labels, Lem-
mas 7 and 9 imply Part 2 of Proposition 1, while Lemmas 8 and 10 imply Part
3.
Now consider any candidate network which is not a PSS. Then by Part 3
of Proposition 1 there exists some link, say ij; which points away from the
characterizing player: Now look at the player which is the furthest away from
the characterizing player along a path containing ij: Then by Part 3 the ￿nal
link of this path is outward-oriented, and its sponsor is an end sponsor. Hence
Part 3 of Proposition 1 implies the following corollary.
Corollary 2 Let network g be a SNN and ￿ > ￿R(c;n;f (I)). If g is not a PSS
then g contains at least one end sponsor.
This Corollary will prove useful in Section 4.
3.3 Characterization of Part 4
Finally we know that in equilibrium, every recipient of a link, say player j
receiving link ij; has either at least two other links16 or no other links. The
reason is the following. If j has one other link, then player i observes at least two
players through ij: If there are two players then he will be indi⁄erent between
them, hence g is not be a SNN. If there are more than two players, then j
is certainly not the best informed player of the group, because he is at the
periphery of that group. His neighbor in that group will be better informed. In
this case i would strictly prefer to replace ij by some other link. This gives us,
without further proof, the following Lemma.
Lemma 11 Let g be a strict Nash network and ￿ > ￿R(c;n;f (I)). Then every
recipient of a link in a SNN either has no other links, or at least two other links.
16A player j has two links in network g if there exist two players k;k0 2 N; where j 6= k 6=
k0 6= j; such that both jk 2 g and jk0 2 g:
14Example 5 Consider the network of Figure 1. Considering link 23; Example
3 shows that it does not matter to player 2 whether he sponsors a link to player
3 or to player 4. Second consider the link 12: Example 3 shows that in the set
A12 (g) the most informed player is player 3. This is because players 2 and 4
are peripheral in gA12(g): So this network cannot be a SNN.
This concludes the proof of Proposition 1.
3.4 The centrality of characterizing players
In Proposition 1 a characterizing player is de￿ned. In this section we show
that the characterizing player is quite central to the network, when centrality is
measured in terms of information gathered (more central players acquire more
information). It appears that characterizing players who are multi-recipient
players are actually the central player of the network too. A non-recipient
characterizing player either is himself a central player, or he sponsors a link to
each central player in the network. In that sense the characterizing player is
always central or almost central in the network.
Proposition 2 Let g be a strict Nash network and ￿ > ￿R(c;n;f (I)). More-
over let Imax (g) be the amount of information of the most informed player in
g: If
1. the characterizing player is a multi-recipient player, then he is the unique
most informed player in g:
2. the characterizing player is a non-recipient player, then the most informed
players are all either the characterizing player or one of the recipients of
links sponsored by the characterizing player. As such, the characterizing
player, ich; either has the most information in g; or his information is
close to being most (in the sense that Iich (g) > ￿Imax (g))
Proof. Let player iV be the most informed player and ich the characterizing
player in g. Consider Part 1 ￿rst, which we will prove by contradiction. If ich
is not the most informed player in g; so ich 6= iV ; then because ich receives
multiple links, there exists at least one player i sponsoring a link to iC such
that iV 2 Aiich (g): This implies that ic 2 AI
iich (g;￿): Since player ich bene￿ts
more from the link iich than player iv does (by decay), this would imply that
Iich (g) > Iiv (g); which is a contradiction.
Now we consider Part 2, which we prove by construction. Note that there are
two possibilities. Either ich is the most informed player, or ich is not the most
informed player. The ￿rst case satis￿es our claim. If it is the second case, then
by connectedness (Lemma 5) ich sponsors a link, say ichj 2 g; through which
he observes iV : Lemma 3 then implies that fjg = AI
ichj (g;￿): Since player j
bene￿ts more from the link ichj then any other player in Aichj (g); it follows
that Ij (g) > Ij0 (g) for any j0 2 Aichj (g): Hence, because iV 2 Aichj (g); we
have iV = j: This concludes the proof of Part 2.
15We conclude this subsection with a remark on the identity of link recipients.
Let us consider the link ij, where ij 2 g and g is a candidate network . If we
accept the notion that information is a good measure for centrality, it follows
from Lemma 3 of Proposition 1 that j is the central player in Aij (g): Hence
links in a candidate network are sponsored to the central player in the recipient￿ s
component.
4 Marginal bene￿ts of information and relative
stability
In this section we will investigate the relative stability of the candidate networks
for three types of bene￿t functions: CMBI, DMBI and IMBI. We say that a
candidate network is more stable than another candidate network if, given ￿;
stability of the latter implies stability of the former but not the other way
around.
We investigate these three special cases of the bene￿t functions, because
they are especially salient to us. The CMBI bene￿t function is often solely
considered in the network formation literature. For instance, Bala and Goyal
(2000a) consider only CMBI when they discuss decay. DMBI is a natural result
if all players get a private signal from a common distribution. The ￿rst signals
are more informative than later signals. IMBI is a natural assumption (at least
until some information level), when some pieces of information are hard to
interpret without other pieces of information17.
The results will show that for any increasing bene￿t function the PSS is
the most stable network architecture. Moreover, for CMBI all other networks
are equally stable (but less stable than the PSS). For DMBI we will show that
each star which is not a PSS is the least stable candidate network. Moreover,
relatively short diameter networks tend to be less stable. For instance, we will
show that if the population is large enough such that there exist candidate
networks with diameter 4, it can be shown that the most stable diameter 4
network is more stable than the most stable diameter 3 network18. In contrast,
under IMBI bene￿t functions, shorter diameter networks tend to be most stable.
For instance, all stars are more stable than non-star candidate networks.
We will ￿rst present the results for CMBI, DMBI and IMBI. Those results
will be discussed at the end of the section.
Proposition 3 Consider the set of candidate networks as identi￿ed by Propo-
sition 1 and Lemma 3, let ￿ > ￿M(c;n;f (I)); and let there be CMBI. Then
1. the PSS is the unique most stable candidate network architecture. It is
stable if and only if c < f
￿
1 + ￿ + (n ￿ 2)￿
2￿
￿ f (1):
17See for instance Cohen and Levinthal (1989). There knowledge of old research results
increases how much one can learn from new research results.
18In Section 5.4 we will strengthen this result.
162. any other candidate networks are equally stable. These are stable if and
only if c < f (1 + ￿) ￿ f (1):
3. The empty network is a SNN if and only if c > f (1 + ￿) ￿ f (1):
Proof. First note that by Lemma 3 no player wishes to replace a link. By
connectedness and ￿ > ￿M(c;n;f (I)); no player in a candidate network wants
to add a link. Hence we are left with checking whether a player wants to delete
links (in case of a candidate network).
ad 1. Observe that for any peripheral player i in a PSS f
￿
1 + ￿ + (n ￿ 2)￿
2￿
￿
f (1) is the added bene￿t of a link. This proves that the PSS is stable if
c < f
￿
1 + ￿ + (n ￿ 2)￿
2￿
￿ f (1):
ad 2. In any other candidate network, we know that there is at least one
end sponsor (Corollary 2). Among all links in a candidate network, the end links
bring the lowest bene￿t to their sponsor, namely (by CMBI) f (1 + ￿) ￿ f (1).
The sponsors will therefore strictly prefer to keep the links if c < f (1 + ￿) ￿
f (1): Because n ￿ 3, we know that f (1 + ￿) ￿ f (1) < f
￿
1 + ￿ + (n ￿ 2)￿
2￿
￿
f (1): Hence all non-empty candidate networks are equally stable, except for
the PSS networks which are more (and most) stable.
ad 3. Finally note that the empty network is stable for c > f (1 + ￿)￿f (1);
because in the empty network any number of added links with the same sponsor
have strictly larger costs than the bene￿ts they generate.
We continue with some results on DMBI bene￿t functions. Note that under
DMBI the added bene￿ts of a link depends on two factors. First, the amount
of information the sponsor would have without the link: the less information he
already has, the higher the bene￿ts of the link will be. And second, the amount
of additional information received through the link: the more, the better.
Proposition 4 Consider the set of candidate networks as identi￿ed by Propo-
sition 1 and Lemma 3, let ￿ > ￿M(c;n;f (I)); and let there be DMBI: Then
1. the PSS is the most stable candidate network architecture. It is stable if
and only if c < f
￿
1 + ￿ + (n ￿ 2)￿
2￿
￿ f (1):
2. all other stars are the only least stable candidate network architectures.
They are stable if and only if c < f (1 + (n ￿ 1)￿) ￿ f (1 + (n ￿ 2)￿):
3. any other candidate networks are strictly in between with regards to the
stability.
4. The empty network is a SNN if and only if c > f (1 + ￿) ￿ f (1):
Proof. First note that by Lemma 3 no player wishes to replace a link, and by
￿ > ￿M(c;n;f (I)); no player in a candidate network wants to add a link.
ad 1. Observe that for any peripheral player i in a PSS f
￿
1 + ￿ + (n ￿ 2)￿
2￿
￿
f (1) is the added bene￿t of a link. This proves that the PSS is stable if
c < f
￿
1 + ￿ + (n ￿ 2)￿
2￿
￿ f (1): Moreover, if in the PSS network one of the
17sponsors prefers not to sponsor a link, then no non-empty network can be stable.
This is because a sponsor in the PSS obtains the maximal possible added ben-
e￿t that can be obtained from sponsoring a link. Without the link the sponsor
would have the minimal possible amount of information (namely 1) while the
link itself gives the maximal amount of additional information which a link can
give: access to one player at distance one and all other players at distance two,
so ￿ +(n ￿ 2)￿
2: If this added bene￿t is too small, then so will be the marginal
bene￿ts of any link in any other candidate SNN. Hence if there is a non-empty
g which is a SNN then any PSS is a SNN too.
ad 2. Observe that the characterizing player sponsors at least one link
in such stars. The extra information through this link is the minimal possi-
ble. However, without the link the sponsor would have access to all but one
of the other players at distance one. This is the maximal amount of informa-
tion that any player can have in a non-connected network. Hence, if in some
minimal network there exists a player who wants to delete his link, then so
does every sponsor who is the characterizing player in a star. This makes all
stars, other than the PSS, the least stable candidate networks. Moreover the
arguments above show that any star other than the PSS is stable if and only if
c < f (1 + (n ￿ 1)￿) ￿ f (1 + (n ￿ 2)￿):
ad 3. We show here that all other candidate networks are strictly less stable
than the PSS and strictly more stable than the other stars. First, note that by
Corollary 2 in any non-PSS candidate network there is at least one end spon-
sor. This player receives only ￿ additional information through his link. By
connectedness of the candidate network implies that without the link he has
more information than 1: Hence he has strictly less incentives to keep his link
than any sponsor in the PSS. Moreover, if the network is not a star, then no
end sponsor will have all other players at distance one from him. This means
that although non-star candidate networks have end sponsors too. These end
sponsors receive as little information through the end link as the characterizing
player does in a star, but they have less information without it. Consequently
each such sponsor has more reason to sponsor their link. Hence all other candi-
date networks are strictly more stable then any star which is not fully periphery
sponsored.
ad 4. The proof is the same as in Proposition 3.
As shown in Proposition 4 the most compact networks (ignoring PSS), with
diameter 2, are less stable than more dispersed, larger diameter networks. We
now show that, if the parameters allow for candidate networks of diameter 4,19
then the most stable diameter 3 network is less stable than some candidate
networks of diameter 4.
Proposition 5 Let there be candidate networks of diameter 4 and let ￿ >
￿M (c;n;f (I)): Then some candidate networks of diameter 4 are more stable
than the most stable candidate network of diameter 3:
19Lemma 9 together with Proposition 8 will show that this is feasible if the population is
su¢ ciently large.
18Proof. Note ￿rst that by Lemma 3 no player has incentives to replace a link.
Moreover, by ￿ > ￿M (c;n;f (I)) we have that all SNNs are minimal, and that
in no candidate network a player wants to add a link. Thus we can focus on
whether each link is strictly worthwhile to its sponsor. We will proceed by
identifying the most stable candidate network of diameter 3, and calculating
the added bene￿t of its end link(s). Then we will construct a candidate network
of diameter 4, and show that the bene￿ts of its end links are higher. Finally
we show that the end links in these two networks are indeed the links with the
lowest added bene￿t.
The most stable diameter 3 network is a PSS with one alteration, namely
that one link by a peripheral player, say j; is deleted and replaced by a link from
one non-isolated peripheral player i; i 6= j, to player j. This is true because the
network must have an end sponsor (Corollary 2), and this puts the maximal
number of players at distance 2 of the end sponsor. Hence his added bene-
￿t of the end link equals f
￿




1 + ￿ + (n ￿ 3)￿
2￿
: Note
that any sponsor of a link which is not an end link, has less information than
f
￿
1 + ￿ + (n ￿ 3)￿
2￿
without that link, and will gain more than ￿ information.
Now we will construct a diameter 4 network where the end link gives a
greater added bene￿t. Take again the PSS and delete the links of two distinct
peripheral players, j and j0: Consider two distinct other peripheral players, i
and i0 and let them form the links ij and i0j0: This network has diameter 4. The
added bene￿t of any of the two end links is then f
￿
















1 + ￿ + (n ￿ 3)￿
2￿
;
we obtain that the added bene￿t of the end link in the diameter 4 network is
larger than in the most stable candidate network of diameter 3.
To conclude the proof note that any sponsor of a link which is not an end
link, has less information than f
￿
1 + ￿ + (n ￿ 4)￿
2 + ￿
3￿
without that link, and
will gain more than ￿ information. Hence the constructed diameter 4 candidate
network is more stable than any candidate network of diameter 3.
Without further proof, this gives us the following result.
Corollary 3 Under DMBI a gap in network diameters can appear. In this
case all SNNs are either PSS (which have diameter 2), or they have a network
diameter of at least d￿ (d￿ ￿ 4):
Finally we present our results for the case of IMBI. Afterwards we will discuss
the intuition behind the results for DMBI and IMBI.
Proposition 6 Consider the set of candidate networks as identi￿ed by Propo-
sition 1 and Lemma 3, let ￿ > ￿M(c;n;f (I)); and let there be DMBI for all
I ￿ 0: Then
1. A PSS is stable if and only if c < f
￿
1 + ￿ + (n ￿ 2)￿
2￿
￿ f (1):
2. A CSS is stable if and only if (n ￿ 1)c < f (1 + (n ￿ 1)￿) ￿ f (1):
193. Stars with k; k 2 f1;:::;n ￿ 2g; center sponsored links are stable if and
only if kc < f (1 + (n ￿ 1)￿)￿f (1 + (n ￿ 1 ￿ k)￿) and c < f
￿




4. The empty network is stable if and only if nc > f (1 + (n ￿ 1)￿) ￿ f (1):
5. If a star has less center-sponsored links, it is weakly more stable.
6. Any other candidate network is less stable than star networks.
Proof. By Lemma 3 no player has incentives to replace a link. Moreover, by
￿ > ￿M (c;n;f (I)) we have that in no candidate network a player wants to add
a link. Thus we can focus on whether each link is strictly worthwhile to its
sponsor.
ad 1. For Part 1 the threshold values have already been proven in Propo-
sition 4.
ad 2 and 3. By IMBI, if the center would prefer to delete any number
of links, he would delete all his links. The reason is that all his links are end
links ￿ giving him ￿ additional information ￿ and that the added bene￿t of
these links is thus increasing. Hence the only possible optimal strategies for the
characterizing player are to delete all these k links or none of them. For stars
with periphery-sponsored links, there is also the condition that those links are
stable. The relevant condition for that is the same as for a PSS. The stability
conditions for Parts 2 and 3 follow.
ad 4. This follows the same reasoning as above: the best response to an
empty network is either to sponsor links to all other players, or to sponsor no
links at all. The condition follows.
ad 5. To prove Part 5 we note that the condition given in Parts 2 and 3,
namely kc < f (1 + (n ￿ 1)￿) ￿ f (1 + (n ￿ 1 ￿ k)￿); is stricter for k + 1 than
for k; provided that k ￿ 1; while the condition for any sponsor of a periphery-
sponsored link remains c < f
￿
1 + ￿ + (n ￿ 2)￿
2￿
￿ f (1). Now we prove that a
PSS cannot be less stable than any other star. If PSS is not stable, it follows
that c ￿ f
￿
1 + ￿ + (n ￿ 2)￿
2￿
￿f (1); so any star with any periphery-sponsored
links is unstable.
What about the CSS, which has only center-sponsored links? Following the
reasoning above, if the PSS is unstable any of the sponsors have two potential
best reply strategies. Either sponsor no links, or to sponsor links to all other
players. He prefers the latter if (n ￿ 1)c < f (1 + (n ￿ 1)￿) ￿ f (1); which
is the stability condition for the CSS. However the latter is ruled out by our
assumption ￿ > ￿M (c;n;f (I)); which ensures that no player prefers to sponsor
non-minimal links.
ad 6. Any non-star candidate network, as well as the CSS, has end links.
The added bene￿t of such an end link increases in the amount of information the
sponsor would have without that link. In the non-star candidate network, end
sponsors have less information than the unique end sponsor in the CSS. Hence,
any non-star candidate network (note that such networks have diameters of at
20least 3) is less stable than the (weakly) least stable star network. This ends the
proof.
Propositions 4, 5 and 6 suggest the following intuition. There are two forces
that can drive a network to be stable, in giving the players incentives to sponsor
costly links. First, players may sponsor links because ex ante they have little
connections, but can access a lot of information by sponsoring a link to a well-
informed player. This e⁄ect is equally at work for CMBI, DMBI and IMBI,
and is strongest in the PSS, explaining why overall this is the most stable
network. Second, players may sponsor a link even though they are already
well-connected, if their marginal bene￿t of doing so is large. In the case of
DMBI, an already well-connected player still has a large marginal bene￿t of
sponsoring an extra link if the players to whom he was already connected are at
a relatively large distance from him. Because of decay, he then does not have
much information, and still has a high marginal bene￿t of sponsoring a link. For
this reason, large-diameter networks with outward point links may be stable on
top of small-diameter networks with inward pointing links. There is thus a gap
in the diameters covered by the stable networks.
In the case of IMBI, a well-connected player still has a large marginal bene￿t
of sponsoring a link if the players to whom he is connected are at a relatively
small distance from him. Because decay has little e⁄ect then, he has a lot
of information, which under IMBI gives him incentives to acquire even more
information by sponsoring a link. Thus, in the case of IMBI, the two di⁄erent
forces both lead to stable networks with a small diameter.
The reader may not yet be convinced by the argument, because the charac-
terization limits itself to showing cost levels exist such that the smallest-diameter
networks on top of the PSS which are stable are diameter-4 networks, and cost
levels exist such that under IMBI all stars are stable, but diameter-3 networks
are. The reasons we are not able to derive further results at this point are the
following. First, we did not derive a general rule assuring that no sponsor wants
to change networks satisfying Proposition 1. Speci￿cally, we have not derived
a rule identifying the most-informed player in larger-diameter components, to
which a sponsor should then connect. The main di¢ culty is that the identity of
the most informed player in components with larger diameters can depend on
delta. Thus, the reason why in Proposition 5 we have limited our attention to
networks of diameter 4 and smaller is that (i) there is only a small number of
architectures of candidate networks, and (ii) it is clear who the best-informed
player in any component is. However, in Section 5 we will derive a simple rule
identifying the most-informed player in any component for a range of ￿ close to
1.
Second, we did not derive a general rule assuring that no player wants to
delete a link. In order to assure this, we need to identify the crucial sponsor(s) in
any candidate SNN. In Section 5.4, we show that for a range of ￿ close to 1, any
crucial sponsor (the sponsor least willing to maintain his links) is always an end
sponsor. Once we know this, we are able to identify which of the candidate SNN
remain stable. Our results will con￿rm the intuition of a gap in the diameters
21covered by the set of SNN under DMBI, and of no such gap in the case of IMBI.
In each of these two sections, the further assumptions made to make the
characterization more detailed are to again impose small decay. While this
approach has its limits (see Section 6), it identi￿es the impact which decay
has even when it would not lead to non-minimality of the network. Recall the
well-known result that in the absence of decay only the CSS is a SNN. In this
sense, our results as well as Proposition 5.3 and 5.4 by Bala and Goyal (2000)
clearly show that the result under the absence of decay that only small diameter
networks are stable is not robust to the introduction of even a small level of
decay. However from Bala and Goyal (2000) and Hojman and Szeidl (2008) a
reader might get the impression that with small decay the diameters of SNNs
remain small. This impression would be false. In fact, we will show in Section
5.4 that under DMBI it can be the case that, next to the small diameter PSS,
only the candidate networks20 with the maximal diameter are stable. Under
IMBI, however, it does continue to be the case under decay that small-diameter
networks are more stable.
Inasfar as the Bala and Goyal two-way ￿ ow model is an accurate description
of some network, we can note on the basis of this section that the small world
hypothesis is most consistent with IMBI which tends to favor low diameter
networks, and less with DMBI which is in comparison unlikely to give rise to
small diameter networks.
5 Small decay and no change in links: balancing
condition
We now show that for small levels of decay, we can derive a simple rule iden-
tifying in any component the most informed player, and at the same time as-
suring that any component to which a player sponsors a link has a unique
most-informed player. In this way, we can characterize the larger diameter min-
imal connected networks with a multi-recipient characterizing player or with a
non-recipient characterizing player meeting the condition that no player wants
to change a link as those that meet the derived rule. Intuitively, for small levels
of decay, any player sponsors a link "in the middle" of any component that he
faces, leaving about the same players on one side and on the other side of the
node he sponsors a link to, where because of small decay, the distance of these
players on one and on the other side does not matter much. Because of this
tendency of any sponsor of leaving about the same players on one side and on
the other side, we refer to this as the balancing condition.
Moreover we show that all candidate networks satisfying the balancing con-
dition are SNN for some range of parameters. Hence every such network is
indeed relevant: the characterization contains no networks which cannot be a
SNN after all.
20These candidate networks satisfy Lemma 3, Proposition 1, and a ￿ balancing condition￿as
will be de￿ned in Section 5.
22Then, in Section 5.3, we calculate the maximum diameter of candidate net-
works satisfying the balancing condition as a function of n: An implication of
the result there is that there is no maximum diameter if the population size can
be chosen freely to accommodate that diameter. From the last two results it fol-
lows that that there are SNN with quite large diameters, although the diameter
remains relatively small with respect to the population size21.
In Section 5.4 we show that for small decay the player most likely to delete
his links will be the end sponsor. Since by small decay and the balancing
condition no player wants to add or replace links, the player most willing to
delete his link(s) is the ￿ crucial player￿ . This allows us, combined with the
results in Section 5.3, to derive a last result, which says that the diameter gap
can be very large: namely that all SNNs either have diameter two (then they
are a PSS) or the maximal diameter of all candidate networks satisfying the
balancing condition.
5.1 The balancing condition
In this section we introduce the balancing condition. It basically says that if
￿ is close enough to 1 and the network is a connected Nash network, then the
recipient of each link is in the middle of the group that the sponsor connects
to through the link. More speci￿cally, if he would sponsor the link to some
neighbor of the recipient instead, there are less players that he would get closer
to than players that he would get further away from. To formalize this result,
we will ￿rst de￿ne the balancing condition and then a new threshold decay level.
De￿nition 8 Network g satis￿es the balancing condition if for any ij 2 g we




￿ ￿ for all jk 2 g.
De￿nition 9 Let ￿B (c;n;f (I)) be the lowest level of decay such that for all
￿ > ￿B (c;n;f (I)) all candidate networks which are SNN satisfy the balancing
condition.
We now show ￿B (c;n;f (I)) < 1:
Proposition 7 For any c > 0; n ￿ 3; and f (I) > 0 we have ￿B (c;n;f (I)) < 1:
Proof. Denote by id
x a player at distance d from player i in component gAii0(g).
Denote by dmax the maximal distance between i and any other player in gAii0(g).






the set of players at distance d from player i
in network gAii0(g) to which player id
x gives access.
We now derive the condition under which a player i sponsoring a link to
i0 in g does not instead want to sponsor a link to any player i2
x at distance 2
21The minimum population size needed for a diameter d candidate network which satis￿es
the balancing condition is exponentially increasing in the diameter.
23from player i in network gAii0(g). The marginal information gain to player i of
sponsoring a link to player i0 = i1












Consider next the marginal information gain to player i of sponsoring a
link to a player i2




















































one step closer than before by switching the link from ii1
x to ii2
x; while the remain-















are now one step further away. So i strictly prefers to keep his link, rather than
replacing it with a link to i2


















), outweighs the bene￿ts of






): This is the case



























De￿ne as ￿B < 1 the largest root of the polynomial on the left-hand side of
(B) that is smaller than 1. Another root of (B) is ￿ = 1, re￿ ecting the fact that
in the absence of decay, it does not matter where the player connects. If the
derivative with respect to ￿ of the left-hand side of (B) is negative at ￿ = 1, then
a range of large ￿s exists such that the player prefers to connect to i1
x rather
than to any i2







































However, this only shows that the condition stated in the proposition is
a necessary condition, as we have only derived a condition assuring that no
24player wants to reconnect to a player at distance 2 in the accessed compo-


















in gAii0(g), where node iz




x. Then by the given condition, player i prefers connecting to
ip




































￿ ￿. Thus, it follows from the condition
that player prefers linking to any player p rather than to player (p + 1) along
the path. The condition is thus su¢ cient.
The balancing condition translates Lemma 3 into a structural property of
the network, provided that there is little enough decay. Let ￿ > ￿B(c;n;f (I)));
and take any minimal network g which satis￿es Lemma 3. Then for any link
ij 2 g we ￿nd that j 2 AI
ij (g;￿) if and only if the balancing condition holds
for link ij. We say that a network g satis￿es the balancing condition if for any




￿ for any jk 2 g.
This gives us the following corollary.
Corollary 4 Let ￿ > maxf￿R (c;n;f (I));￿B (c;n;f (I))g. A given network
satis￿es Lemma 3 if and only if it meets the balancing condition.
We say that a network g which satis￿es the balancing condition is a balanced
network. A candidate network which satis￿es the balancing condition is thus a
balanced candidate network.
We continue in the following section by proving that any balance candidate
network is indeed a SNN for some positive range of parameters.
5.2 Are balanced candidate networks indeed SNN?
The main problem with having only necessary conditions for SNNs in a charac-
terization is that the characterization may include networks which are not SNN.
In this subsection we show that this problem does not apply to balanced candi-
date networks. In other words: for each balanced candidate network there exists
some feasible positive range of parameters and some class of bene￿t functions
such that this balanced candidate network is in fact a SNN.
Proposition 8 Consider a network g which satis￿es the Properties of Propo-
sition 1 and the Balancing Condition. Then there exists some range of para-
meters ￿ and c and a value function f (I), f0 > 0; such that g is a SNN and
￿ > ￿R(c;n;f (I)).
25Proof. We prove this by construction. For simplicity, consider a bene￿t func-
tion of the following form: f (I) = Ik; where k > 0: If k > 1; we have IMBI, for
k = 1 we have CMBI and for k < 1 we have DMBI. We will ￿rst look at the
incentives to delete a link. After that we will consider the incentives to add a
link, and to the incentives to replace a link.
Note that the addition of a minimal link gives not less than ￿ additional
information. This implies that the added bene￿t of such a link is at least
f (1 + ￿)￿f (1) if k ￿ 1, while it is at least f (1 + (n ￿ 1)￿)￿f (1 + (n ￿ 2)￿)
for k < 1: A player has a strict preference not to delete a link, if its costs are
strictly less than its bene￿ts. The minimum bene￿ts are, as note above,




k ￿ 1; (1 + (n ￿ 1)￿)




Then, picking some arbitrary ￿
￿ 2 (0;1); and choosing c < bmin (￿
￿;f (I)); we
obtain that no player prefers to delete a link in network g.
Second, we will look at the incentives to add links. We start by noting that,
regardless of k; bmin (￿) is non-decreasing in ￿:22 So if ￿ > ￿
￿; and c < bmin (￿
￿)
then c < bmin (￿): Hence we can pick a ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ close enough to 1, speci￿cally
￿ > maxf￿
￿;￿M (c;n;f (I))g; such that no player wishes to sponsor any non-
minimal link. Because bmin (￿;f (I)) is non-decreasing in ￿; it remains to be
true that no player wishes to delete a link:
Thirdly, we consider the incentives to replace a link. Network g satis￿es the
balancing condition, hence by Proposition 7 there exists some ￿B (c;n;f (I))
such that for all ￿ > ￿B (c;n;f (I)) we have that j 2 AI
ij (g;￿) for any ij 2 g.
This implies that no player is willing to replace that link because doing so would
reduce the information gathered without saving any costs.
Summarizing:
- given an arbitrary ￿
￿ 2 (0;1) and
- a value function f (I) such that bmin (￿) increases in ￿ (e.g. f (I) = Ik,
k > 0);
- there exists a range of c (namely c < bmin (￿
￿))
- and ￿ (speci￿cally ￿ > maxf￿
￿;￿M (c;n;f (I));￿B (c;n;f (I))g)
- for which no player wants delete a link, add or replace a link.
This proves the Proposition.
Having shown that each balanced candidate networks is indeed a SNN for the
right parameters, we are interested in the relationship between the maximal di-




(1 + (n ￿ 1)￿)k ￿ (1 + (n ￿ 2)￿)k
￿
￿ 0; which simpli￿es to (n ￿ 1)
1
1￿k ￿ (n ￿ 2)
1
1￿k








: Since the LHS is positive and the RHS is
negative, this is satis￿ed, and bmin (￿;f (I)) is non-decreasing in ￿:
26ameter of balanced candidate networks and the population size. We investigate
this in the following section.
5.3 Maximal diameter of balanced candidate networks
The balancing condition implies that large-diameter networks may be SNN. The
PSS is then only one out of many possible networks. To illustrate the possibility
of large diameter networks, we now derive the maximal-diameter SNN for all
n ￿ 5 (for smaller n, only stars are SNN). We start by deriving a Lemma that
we need to ￿nd the maximal-diameter SNN.
Lemma 12 Consider a minimally connected balanced network g. Let ij 2 g be
such that it gives access to an end recipient at distance s from player i. Then
1. If i gets access to the end recipient at distance s through a link sponsored
by player j, then in the component to which player j gives access, player
i has at least
x+1 X
l=1
2l players at distance (s ￿ x) or larger from her, where
0 ￿ x ￿ (s ￿ 2).
2. For s ￿ 3, if i gets access to the end recipient at distance s through a
link received by j other than ij, then in the component to which player j




at distance (s￿x) or larger from her, where 0 ￿ x ￿ (s￿4); (b) Player i
has at least 1+
s￿3 X
l=1
2l players at distance 3 or larger in component gAij(g);
and (c) at least 4 + 2
s￿3 X
l=1
2l players at distance 2 or larger in component
gAij(g).
Proof. We ￿rst prove 1. and 2(a). If an end sponsor k receives a link from a
player i, then by Property 4, k should sponsor at least two links.
Let an end sponsor k receiving a link from a player l sponsor exactly two
end links. Then, if player l is himself a sponsor, then by the balancing condition
(see Proposition 7), player l￿ s links should point to at least 6 players at distance
1 or 2 from her, and at least 2 players at distance 2 from her.
Let player l￿ s links point to exactly 6 players, at distance 1 or 2 from her,
and let player l herself receive a link from player h. Then, if player h is himself
a sponsor, his links should point to at least 14 players at distance 1, 2 or 3 from
her, at least 6 players at distance 2 or 3 from her, and at least 2 players at
distance 3 from her. And so forth.
We next prove 2(b). This follows simply from the fact that there must be




27at distance 4 or larger.
In order to prove 2(c), note ￿rst that given the above, there is at least one








￿ ￿ = 2+
s￿3 X
l=1
2l, meaning that by the balancing condition,




We now derive the maximal diameter networks that can be achieved for
any n. In order to do this, we derive the minimal number of nodes n that are
needed to achieve a network of given diameter d. For this n, and for a range of
populations just above it, this is then also the maximal diameter network that
can be achieved.














2l￿1) = 2), the maximal-diameter balanced candidate networks have
diameter d = x. For n such that 4 + 3
(x￿1)=2 X
l=1




2l￿1 (where (1 + 2(x+1)=2 + 2
(x+1)=2 X
l=1




the maximal-diameter balanced candidate networks have diameter d = (x + 1).
Proof. It su¢ ces to derive the minimal number of nodes n1(d1) needed to
achieve a network with any even diameter d1, and the minimal number of nodes
n2(d2) needed to achieve a network with any odd diameter d2. Once we have
these results, it immediately follows that for any n with n1(d1) < n < n2(d2),
the maximal achievable diameter is d1, and for any n with n2(d2) < n < n1(d1),
the maximal achievable diameter is d2.
Even diameter and minimal number of nodes. We here show that in
order to construct a candidate network that meets the balancing condition and




We ￿rst show that the minimal number of nodes needed to achieve a net-
work with a multi-recipient characterizing player of even diameter d1 ￿ 4 is the
given n. By the de￿nition of a multi-recipient player, at least two of the nodes
at distance 1 from such a characterizing player must sponsor links towards him
28Figure 3: Maximal-diameter network for n = 25.
(though the characterizing player may sponsor links himself as well). Further-







in order to put an end recipient at any distance s from a sponsor i of the multi-
recipient characterizing player j using a minimal number of nodes, it should
be that i accesses this end recipient through a sponsor k of the multi-recipient
characterizing player, and not through a link sponsored by the characterizing
player. Thus, in order to construct with a minimal number of nodes a network
with a multi-recipient characterizing player where two end recipients l and m
are at distance d1 from each other, we can limit ourselves to networks where
sponsor i (respectively sponsor k) of the characterizing player j accesses end
recipient l (m) through sponsor k (i) of the characterizing player.
Consider in particular such a diameter-d1 with two end recipients each at
distance d1=2 of the multi-recipient characterizing player, and let us derive the
minimal number of nodes necessary to construct such a network. By Lemma
12, sponsor i (respectively k) of the characterizing player must give sponsor k
(i) access to at least 1 +
d1=2￿1 X
l=1
2l￿1 nodes (where i (k) is included himself).
This means that sponsor k (respectively i) has this same number of nodes at
distance 2 or more in the component that includes i (k) and the links sponsored
29by i (k). Applying the balancing condition now, it follows that k (i) should
have at least this same number of links at distance 2 or more in components
to which characterizing player j gives access, but to which i (k) does not give
access. It follows that n = 4 + 3
d1=2￿1 X
l=1
2l￿1 is the minimal number of nodes
necessary to construct a diameter-d1 with two end recipients at opposite sides
each at distance d1=2 from the characterizing player.
To show that a balanced candidate network with such a number of nodes
indeed exists, consider a two-sponsor network where exactly three players spon-
sor a link to the multi-recipient characterizing player. There are exactly 3￿2l￿1
players at distance l from the characterizing player, with 2 ￿ l ￿ d1=2￿1, whose
links point away from the characterizing player. Such a network indeed meets
Property 4 of Proposition 1, and meets the balancing condition. An example is
the network in Figure 3 for n = 25 and d1 = 8.
Next, we show that alternative diameter-d1 networks with a multi-recipient
characterizing player, where at one end of the network an end recipient is at
distance smaller than d1=2 of the characterizing player, and at the other end of
the network an end recipient is at distance larger than d1=2, use a larger number
of nodes. By Lemma 12, due to the exponentially increasing number of nodes
needed to increase the maximal distance between the characterizing player and
an end recipient, decreasing the distance between the characterizing player and
an end recipient on one side of the network and increasing this distance at the
other side of the network while maintaining diameter d1 is only possible when
more nodes are used.




construct a network with a non-recipient characterizing player that achieves a
higher diameter than d1. In order to show this, we show that, for even d1,
the minimal number of nodes needed to achieve a diameter-d1 network with
a non-recipient characterizing player is always at least as high as the minimal
number of nodes needed to achieve a diameter-d1 network with a multi-recipient
characterizing player. Consider a diameter-d1 network with a non-recipient char-
acterizing player with two end recipients at distance d1 from one another, and
each at distance d1=2 from the characterizing player. In such a network, the
characterizing player sponsors at least two links. By Lemma 12, the charac-
terizing player has at least 2
d1=2￿1 X
l=1
2l nodes at distance 2 or more from him.
Together with the minimum of two players at distance 1, this means a min-






2l￿1 nodes at distance 1 or more. Thus, to




30To show that a network using this number of nodes indeed exists, consider a
symmetric network where there are exactly 2l￿1 nodes at distance l from the
characterizing player, with 1 ￿ l ￿ d1=2, and note that this network meets
Property 4 of Proposition 1, and meets the balancing condition. By Lemma 12,
decreasing the distance between the characterizing player and an end recipient
at one side of characterizing player in order to increase the distance between
the characterizing player and an end recipient on the other side of the char-




2l￿1 is the minimal number of nodes with which we can construct
a diameter-d1 network with a non-recipient characterizing player.







is obtained only for d1 = 4). It follows that to construct a network with even




Odd diameter and minimal number of nodes. Next, we show that
in order to construct a candidate network that meets the balancing condition




2l￿1 nodes. Consider a diameter-d2 network with two end recipients at
distance d2 from each other, where one end recipient is at distance (d2￿1)=2 of
the non-recipient characterizing player, and the other end recipient at distance
(d2 +1)=2. In such a network, the characterizing player has at least two players






2l at distance 2 or more from him. Together with the minimum of two







at distance 1 or more. Thus, in order to construct a diameter-d2 network of the
given type, we need at least n = 1 + 2(d2￿1)=2 + 2
(d2￿1)=2 X
l=1
2l￿1 nodes. To show
that a network using this number of nodes indeed exists, consider a network
where the non-recipient accesses two components. In each of these components,
there are exaclty 2l￿1 nodes at distance l from the characterizing player, with
1 ￿ l ￿ (d2 ￿ 1)=2. In one of the two components, there are additionally
exactly 2(d2￿1)=2 players at distance (d2 ￿ 1)=2 from the characterizing player.
An example is the network in Figure 4 for n = 23 and d2 = 7. Note that such a
network meets Property 4 of Proposition 1, and meets the balancing condition.
31Figure 4: Maximal diameter network for n = 23:
Next, note that by Lemma 12, due to the exponentially increasing number of
nodes needed to increase the maximal distance between the characterizing player
and an end recipient, decreasing the distance between the characterizing player
and an end recipient on one side of the network and increasing this distance
at the other side of the network while maintaining diameter d2 is only possible
when additional nodes are used. It follows that the given n is the minimal
number of nodes need to construct a diameter-d2 network with a non-recipient
characterizing player.
Second, we show that in order to achieve a network with odd diameter d2
in a network with a multi-recipient characterizing player, one needs more nodes
than in the speci￿ed network with a non-recipient characterizing player. By the
analysis above, in order to achieve a network with even diameter (d2 ￿ 1), the
minimal number of nodes is achieved in e.g. the two-sponsor network with a
multi-recipient characterizing an example of which is given in Figure 3. Note
now that applying the balancing condition to the sponsors of the characterizing
player, in order to increase the diameter of such a network to d2, one needs to
add at least the same number of nodes as are needed to increase the diameter
32to (d2 + 1). As 4 + 3
(d2+1)=2￿1 X
l=1
2l￿1 ￿ 1 ￿ 2(d2￿1)=2 ￿ 2
(d2￿1)=2 X
l=1
2l￿1 = 2, this
means that more nodes are needed than to achieve diameter d2 for the network
with a non-recipient characterizing player.




2l￿1 ￿ n < 4 + 3
(x￿1)=2 X
l=1
2l￿1 , one can achieve diameter d = x e.g. by
letting the non-recipient characterizing player sponsor additional links. For n
such that 4 + 3
(x￿1)=2 X
l=1
2l￿1 ￿ n < 1 + 2(x+1)=2 + 2
(x+1)=2 X
l=1
2l￿1, one can achieve
diameter d = (x + 1) e.g. by giving the multi-recipient characterizing player
extra sponsors.
We conclude from this section that networks of any diameter can be balanced
candidate networks, provided that n is large enough. Proposition 8 implies that
any such network can indeed be a SNN. Therefore SNNs may have any ￿nitely
large diameter, if the population size can be freely chosen. This result di⁄ers
signi￿cantly from the small diameter networks which were reported by earlier
studies on this subject, namely the stars and interlinked stars (diameter 3) in
Bala and Goyal (2000), and the PSS in Hojman and Szeidl (2008).
5.4 Diameter gap revisited
In this section, we show that the results of Proposition 5 and Corollary 3 ex-
tend to larger diameter networks. Speci￿cally, we show that if there is little
enough decay then cost levels exist such that under DMBI only the PSS and
the maximal-diameter network are stable. We show that for small enough decay,
the sponsor who is most likely to delete a link is an end sponsor. As such we
will call him the crucial sponsor. Note that we established before that for small
enough decay (i) no player wants to add a non-minimal link, and (ii) no player
wants to change his link if the network is balanced. Consequently, in order to
check that no player wants to delete a link in any candidate SNN that is not
a PSS, it su¢ ces to focus on the end sponsors in this network. With this in
mind, we then compare the marginal bene￿ts of the crucial end sponsors across
all non-PSS candidate SNN. For DMBI, the networks with the least-informed
crucial end sponsor are the most stable non-PSS networks, in that we can then
￿nd a cost level c such that the only stable networks are the PSS and these
networks.
We start by showing that, for small decay, any crucial sponsor is an end
sponsor. In order to show this, we ￿rst show this to be the case in the absence
of decay.
Lemma 13 Let ￿ = 1. Then in any minimal connected network g, any end
sponsor i has a smaller marginal bene￿t of sponsoring an end link ii0; ii0 2 g;
than any sponsor j has to sponsor non-end link jj0 2 g.
33Proof. In the absence of decay, the marginal bene￿t of sponsoring a link of any
sponsor i sponsoring a link to j equals f(N) ￿ f(N ￿ x), where x ￿ 1 is the
number of players that player i accesses by sponsoring a link to j. Given that
f0 > 0, the sponsor has a larger marginal bene￿t the more players he accesses,
and any end sponsor thus has the smallest marginal bene￿t.
By continuity, it follows that for su¢ ciently small decay, any non end sponsor
has a larger marginal bene￿t than any end sponsor.
Lemma 14 A level of decay ￿E (c;n;f (I)) exists such that for all ￿ > ￿E (c;n;f (I))
and for every minimally connected network g, any end sponsor i has a smaller
marginal bene￿t of sponsoring a single link than any non end sponsor j.
Proof. Given Lemma 13, in the absence of decay, the marginal bene￿t of
sponsoring an end link in any network with end links equals f(N) ￿ f(N ￿ 1),
and is strictly smaller than the marginal bene￿t of sponsoring any non end link.
It follows by continuity that for levels of ￿ close enough to 1 this continues to
be true.
For DMBI, it follows that in order to check whether no player wants to delete
any links, it su¢ ces to check that a single end sponsor, the crucial end sponsor,
does not want to delete a single link. By DMBI, the crucial end sponsor of a
network is the end sponsor who has the most information. Each network has
at least one crucial end sponsor. After identifying a crucial end sponsor for
each candicate balanced network, the bene￿ts of these crucial end sponsors of
sponsoring a single end link can then be compared across these networks. The
size of this bene￿t depends on the crucial end sponsor￿ s ex ante information. We
now look for the network whose crucial end sponsor has the smallest possible ex
ante information, as this is the network where the end sponsor is most motivated
to keep his link. Intuitively, the crucial end sponsor in a network tends to have
less ex ante information the larger the diameter of the network. We show that
this intuition is valid for a particular n, where the SNN with maximal diameter
has the crucial end sponsor with the least ex ante information across all non-PSS
SNN.




2l￿1 (with d1 even, and d1 ￿ 4), a level of decay ￿D (c;n;f (I)) ex-
ists such that for every ￿ > ￿D (c;n;f (I)), the networks with the crucial end
sponsors with the least ex-ante information have the maximal diameter that can
be achieved for this n.
Proof. Consider for the given n the two-sponsor maximal-diameter network ar-
chitecture described in the proof of Proposition 9 (see Figure 3 for an example).
Below we will show that the crucial end sponsors of lower diameter networks
have more information than the crucial end sponsors in this two-sponsor net-
work. Because this two-sponsor network has the maximal diameter it follows
34that the network with the crucial end sponsors with the least ex-ante informa-
tion have the maximal diameter that can be achieved for this n.
In order to compare the information of crucial end sponsors across networks,
compare in general the ex ante information of a crucial end sponsor i in one
candidate SNN, and the ex ante information of a crucial end sponsor k in another












3 + :::. Crucial end sponsor i has less ex ante









3 + ::: < 0:
For ￿ = 1, the two crucial end sponsors have exactly the same information, and
















k) + ::: > 0: (4)
If inequality (4) is valid, then for a range of ￿ close to 1 exists such that crucial
end sponsor i has less ex ante information than crucial end sponsor k. Given
the coe¢ cients in this inequality, this means that for small decay, the number of
nodes far away from a player matter more in determining a player￿ s comparative
level of ex ante information than the number of nodes close by.
We now apply this result to compare the information of the crucial end
sponsor in the two-sponsor network to the information of an end sponsor in a
balanced candidate network with diameter smaller than d1. We can consider
any smaller diameter network as a network in which one or more nodes have
come closer to crucial end sponsor i in the two-sponsor network. We focus on
the comparison with balanced candidate networks with diameter (d1￿1). In any
network of the latter type, end sponsor i will now have 2￿2d1=2￿2 nodes (namely
the end nodes at distance (d1 ￿1) from him in the two-sponsor network) closer
by. Let us next look at the number of nodes that could be further from him.
The 2￿2d1=2￿3 nodes at distance (d1￿2) from end sponsor i in the two-sponsor
network cannot be put further away, since otherwise we would again obtain a
network with diameter d1. Finally, in order to maintain diameter (d1￿1), of the
nodes at distance smaller than (d1￿1) to the end sponsor, along a line, at least
(d1￿1) nodes should remain at the same distance of the end sponsor (including
the end sponsor himself, who is at a distance of zero from himself). It follows
that the end sponsor i can have at most (n￿2￿2d1=2￿3 ￿2￿2d1=2￿2 ￿(d1 ￿1))
nodes further away from him than in the original network.
As (n￿2￿2d1=2￿3 ￿2￿2d1=2￿2 ￿(d1 ￿1)) < 2￿2d1=2￿2, by the decrease in
diameter, the end sponsor gets more nodes closer by than further o⁄. Moreover,
the nodes that come closer are the ones that used to be furthest away. Given






k) + ::: > 0, nodes
further away count more, it follows that for small decay the end sponsor has
more information in the modi￿ed network. It is easy to see now that this e⁄ect
is even more pronounced for larger decreases in diameter away from d1: even
35more nodes will then come close to an end sponsor, and even less nodes can be
put further away.
An example of a maximal-diameter network with crucial end sponsors with
the smallest possible ex-ante information is the network in Figure 3 for the case
n = 25. We can now use Lemma 15 to show that for the speci￿ed n, levels of c
exist such that the only stable networks are the PSS and networks with maximal
diameter. Thus, e.g. for n = 25, relatively large levels of linking costs exist such
that the only two stable network architectures are the PSS (diameter 2), and
the maximal-diameter network, such as Figure 3 (diameter 8) for n = 25.
Proposition 10 Consider the set of balanced candidate networks. Moreover
let the bene￿t function be a DMBI function and let ￿ > maxf￿R (c;n;f (I));




(with d1 even). Consider now the crucial end sponsor of the network with the
crucial end sponsors with the least ex-ante information. Let MB￿ denote the
marginal bene￿t to this crucial end sponsor of one of his end links. Then
1. For MB￿ ￿ c < f(1+￿+(N ￿2)￿
2)￿f(1), the only non-empty SNN are
the PSS.
2. A cost level c￿ strictly smaller than MB￿ exists such that for c￿ ￿ c <
MBmax, the only SNN are the PSS and at least one of the maximal-
diameter networks.
Proof. By Lemma 15, for the speci￿ed n, the network with the least ex-
ante informed crucial end sponsor has the maximal diameter among the set of
balanced candidate networks. Under DMBI, this means that this network has
the crucial end sponsor with the largest marginal bene￿t of sponsoring an end
link, MB￿. By Proposition 4, the marginal bene￿t of a link in the PSS is strictly
larger than that of any other link in any other network. It follows that both
cost levels must exist where the PSS are the only SNN, and where the speci￿ed
maximal-diameter networks and the PSS are the only SNN.
Propositions 4 and 10 together show the following for small enough decay
and DMBI. For small linking costs, a wide range of networks is stable, including
large diameter networks. As the cost of linking is gradually increased, the ￿rst
non-empty networks to become unstable are the non-PSS stars. For speci￿c n,
as the cost of linking is further increased, the one-but-last type of networks to
leave the set of non-empty SNN are the maximal-diameter networks where the
distance between any two end sponsors is either 2 or is equal to the maximal
diameter. Eventually, the last type of non-empty networks to leave the set of
SNN are the PSS, after which the set of non-empty SNN is empty.
Yet, one should not conclude from this that there is a monotone relationship
between the diameter of non-PSS balanced candidate networks and stability.
36For example, take the network in Figure 3, and in order to construct a stable
network for the case n = 26, modify the network by adding one player j who
sponsors a link to the characterizing player in the network, i. Then the end
sponsors continue to all be crucial end sponsors, and this large-diameter network
continues to be relatively stable under DMBI. Yet, if we modify this network
now only by letting i sponsor the link to j instead of the other way around,
player i becomes the crucial end sponsor, and has more information than the
other end sponsors. This small change, which leaves the diameter of the network
unchanged, signi￿cantly reduces the range of c for which this modi￿ed network
is stable under DMBI.
6 Conclusion
The purpose of this paper is to investigate what happens when slightly deviating
from a standard network formation model without decay by introducing small
levels decay. We wish to highlight three of the contributions of this paper. A
￿rst contribution has been to characterize such networks. This characterization
shows for instance that there is at most one player receiving multiple links,
that links tend to be outward oriented and that large diameter networks can be
stable, even though these networks are ine¢ cient.
A second contribution of this paper is to show a su¢ ciency result, namely
that every network satisfying a certain set of properties is a strict Nash network
for some range of parameters.
A third contribution of this paper is to analyze the relative stability of dif-
ferent network architectures. A general result is that if any non-empty net-
work is stable, then all periphery-sponsored stars are stable. This is because
the characterizing player in this case has the highest possible quality of infor-
mation, and connecting to him is an all-or-nothing decision. Under constant
marginal bene￿ts of information, if linking costs are decreased su¢ ciently to
make the periphery-sponsored star stable, then all possible networks including
large-diameter networks simultaneously become stable. Under decreasing mar-
ginal bene￿ts of information, the second-most stable networks are large-diameter
networks. Intuitively, it is the fact that players have relatively little informa-
tion in a large-diameter network that gives them strong incentives to sponsor
their links. Under increasing marginal bene￿ts of information, the second-most
stable networks are other star networks. Intuitively, it is the fact that the char-
acterizing player already has a lot of information that under increasing marginal
bene￿ts of information still gives him an incentive to sponsor another link.
While these results are intuitive, we should still formulate some caveats .
First, our analysis shows that in order to construct a larger-diameter network,
one needs an exponentially increasing number of players. This is because each
recipient should sponsor at least two links. Thus, within the parameters of
our analysis, this puts a bound on the diameters that can be reached. For
instance, the maximal diameter of any stable network for 10 players is 4, but
the maximal diameter for 100 players is only 12. Second, for larger levels of
37decay than in our analysis, when any players are at a large distance from a given
player in a network, this player may ￿nd it worth to form a non-minimal link,
thus bringing this player closer. For larger levels of decay, this puts a further
bound on the maximal diameter of networks. Third, the larger the number
of players, the larger the diameter of the maximal-diameter the network, and
the more incentives the player would seem to have to sponsor a non-minimal
link. In this sense, for a large number of player, the stability of the maximal-
diameter networks would not seem to be plausible. Yet, as we have shown,
while the maximal diameter increases with the number of nodes, it increases at
a sharply decreasing rate. Also, under decreasing marginal bene￿ts, for which
the stability of maximal-diameter networks was argued, increasing the number
of players also means giving a player less incentives to sponsor a non-minimal
link. Indeed, adding nodes to a network without increasing its diameter, under
DMBI players have less incentives to sponsor links. Fourth, part of our analysis
is based on the result that for small levels of decay, players always sponsor "in
the middle" of any component, leaving the same number of players on one side
and on the other side of the sponsored node. The degree of individual nodes in
this case plays no role. However, for larger levels of decay, what matters most
to a sponsor is how many players he has nearby. This again limits the maximal
diameter that a network may achieve, as it creates a tendency for sponsoring
to a characterizing player. Fifth, part of our analysis is based on the fact that
for small levels of decay, the crucial sponsor in a network is always an end
sponsor, as this sponsor accesses the information of only a single player. Yet,
for larger levels of decay and under DMBI, a sponsor may be crucial because
he is already very well-informed. Thus, under DMBI, the player with the most
direct links may become crucial, and a network may then become more stable
by letting such a player additionally access a lot of information through his link.
This again reduces the relevance of large-diameter networks. Still, even in an
analysis that takes into account such countervailing e⁄ects, the e⁄ect that under
DMBI (IMBI), increasing (decreasing) the diameter of the network gives players
more incentives to sponsor a link will continue to apply.
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